The Crown (Netflix 4 seasons)

1. 終於看完四季，很多看不懂的歷史。希望這套劇集能出版文字版。
   
   
2. 五季故事主角當然是皇后，不過從劇集中可以總結幾點：
• 這是有關一個大家族的故事，而剛好這是一個皇帝家族。
• 圍繞這個家族的每個人都是為一個人而服務而必須忘記自已，犧牲自已，皆因他們享用的都是來自於維護著她的尊嚴。
• 皇后經歷了多位首相，當中最深刻當然是Churchill 和Thatcher。 創作者Churhill 是忍耐的，沒有大肆批評他的種族主義；可對Thatcher，我就寫手一定是一個大左膠，對這住女首相一點也沒有同情之處，還處處提醒她的獨裁、冷血和無情，連重男輕女也突然出來。雖然她以女性的身份在眾多男人中突圍而出，可她對性別的解放並沒有任何貢獻。
• 另外，有關dianna，最後一季明顯是對她有無限的同情，對charles 王子卻毫無憐憫，而且還展現出一個被寵壞的男孩，沒有責任心，對妻子無情，只為自已，對家族帶來一連串的尷尬。
  
  

Akasuka Kid (2021)

1. 最驚喜的是看到鈴木保奈美，三十多年再看她，還是很有女人味。
2. 與其說是有關北野武的電影，應該是有關他師父的電影。
3. 日本人重情、重物、重人的極致表現。
4. 音樂很有六七十年代的風味。
5. 顏色跟台劇《華燈初上》很類似，不知是誰抄誰。
6. 條通文化，在這電影也有展現。

The Crown S4:E2

1. 不看也不知道，印度最後一個總督原來是queen 的叔叔，真皇室成員。
2. 然後，他在英國政治中參與頗深，當中有過rumor 他參與對 Prime Minister Harold Wilson的政變。
3. 他與charles 的關係原來那麼深。
4. 最後，他原來死於一次恐襲，irs 還即時承認責任。這篇ny times 有詳細報導。
5. 下一部要看的作品：
• Viceroy's House (2017) 
• Lord Mountbatten: The Last Viceroy (2005) 

陳果專訪：不用刻意解讀，就當《三夫》是有社會意識的 AV

原文出處

特約撰稿人 何阿嵐 發自東京

2018-11-15

2018金馬獎電影金馬獎陳果《三夫》香港獨立電影

陳果從沒有停止過他的電影步伐。而他的電影總是關於香港，是古惑仔的青春輓歌，是北方妓女來港求財，還是一群存活於末日後的香港人，陳果一次又一次對準這片土地。

2015年拍完有關香港作家西西的紀錄片後，他走到中國拍了三部商業作，對他來說這是一連串針對商業電影的嘗試，「我要再試一試商業製作。」之後，最廣為人知的舊作《香港製造》重新修復、上映，又為新導演陳小娟監製首部劇情電影《淪落人》，相距三年，他回到獨立製作，新作《三夫》在東京國際電影節，金馬影展，香港亞洲電影節先後上映。

椅子還未坐暖，氣氛窘迫，早已知道墨鏡背後的陳果在任何訪問、講座期間都避談關於新作的種種解釋，「你看到什麼，那就是什麼，我不能給你答案。」他會和你談小成本製作有多不容易，船底有多深拍攝空間有多窄、女主角的演出能量如何影響電影成果，一觸及政治話題時他總是輕輕帶過。我以為這是近年政治氣氛形成了我們之間的距離。

被訪者要麼會大說特說政治見解，更多是避而不談，陳果有時是前者，有時是後者。 似乎單單從一位導演身上對當下社會的理解做判斷，也不怎麼公平的。像陳果那樣經由電影工業訓練的電影工作者，自覺作為電影導演的責任其實是如何吸引觀眾入場，如何追求電影媒介來說自己想說的。借用他的說法，他要思考的其實是電影如何拍得好看。

鬼同你住（2021）

1. 連鬼都怕無屋住，而人為怕買不到屋，凶宅都照買照住。
2. 同鬼住恐怖？定無屋住恐怖？
3. 香港法律最偉大嘅地方，就係可以改來改去。

我是挺喜歡陳果的，尤其香港三部曲，以及妓女三部曲。紅van，餃子也不錯。

不過，聽說很多人批評他，雖然有些不太理解，由今天開始研究一下？

從洛楓這篇開始？

Enemy at the Gates (2001)

1. "My name is Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev.   I've come to take things in hand here.  This city is not Kursk, not is it Kiev, nor Minsk.  This city is Stalingrad.  STALINGRAD! This city bears the name of the boss.  It's more than a city.  It's a symbol.  If the Germans captured this city, the entire country will collapse." 
   
   
2. Khrushchev: "I don't care if you've lost half your men! Lose the other half, or lose yourself!" 

The Crown: S3E7 Moondust

 [Philip] I don't know what I was thinking.  I expected them to be giants, gods.  In reality, they were just three little men.  Pale-faced, with colds.  

[Elizabeth] I have some sympathy.  The very qualities that made them perfect for the job.

[Philip] But their lack of flair or imagination. 

[Elizabeth] Their sense of duty, and modesty and reliability. 

[Philip] Total absence of originality or spontaneity ...

[Elizabeth] But that's what makes them perfect in a crisis.  

[Philip] And entirely anticlimactic when you meet them in person.  I mean, imagine.  They go all that way to the moon and stay healthy but one trip to London nearly kills them. 

江雪專文：長安十日

 江雪，中國獨立記者，西北政法學院（現西北政法大學）畢業，基於「當時中國公檢法的名聲不好」而轉入媒體，進入西安華商報，因揭露真相的調查報告獲得南方週末頒發的2002年度「傳媒公眾服務傑出表現獎」，以及央視2003年頒發的「全國八大風雲記者」，2013年被告知「不能再談民主法治」，於是轉往財新傳媒擔任調查記者，由於環境未見改善，2015年決定成為獨立媒體人，經營自媒體「雪訪」。去年末疫情再爆發，西安封城後，江雪撰寫〈長安十日〉，迅速在華文圈傳布，與前年武漢封城的〈方方日記〉齊名。

-------------

我的封城十日誌

社區裡的大喇叭又響了起來，一遍遍重複著，喊人們下樓做核酸。隊排了很長。測核酸的女生，每做完一個，都使勁地用消毒水拍打著自己的塑膠手套。我聞著那冰涼的氣味，想像著她的手已凍成青紫。

這是2021年12月31日。舊年的最後一個黃昏，暮色即將降臨。從陽臺上看出去，大街上空寂無人。這城市不再有車水馬龍的傍晚，死一般的寂靜讓人感到荒謬而又有一絲恐懼。

1   封城當日

12月22日下午，西安封城令宣佈當天。我悶著頭在南郊的家裡編稿子，隱約感覺到疫情變得嚴重。家門口的一些餐館幾天前就被貼了封條，門口的便利店前一天已不再接快遞，生活開始不方便。三點多，朋友隨喜微信留言，說還是去買些菜吧，儲備一些食物，馬上超市都要關門了。我相信她，她是資深的公益人，有多次遠程救災的經驗。於是立馬出門。

到超市就發現情形不對。雖然當天的新聞發佈會還沒召開，傍晚的大搶購還沒開始，但人們的購物車都塞得滿滿當當。我決定多買一些，共用單車是馱不回去了，最後還是用車載了回去。

果然五點多的新聞發佈會上，下了「封城令」，雖然政府說「物資供應充分」，但人們已開始搶購。我因已買好東西，心裡比較篤定。忙完了，出去轉轉。路上看到，高新區的沙井村村口，聚集了一大堆人。整個村子外面，沿路邊有兩三百米，都已被綠色的板子隔了起來。

從天橋走到路對面想看看詳情，這才發現，有一家正在營業的商店，也被隔在了擋板裡邊，暫時還燈火通明。我站在天橋的臺階上，和老闆打招呼。他告訴我，下午緊急封村，商店過一會兒就得關門了。

兩篇被大公批的文章: 羅永生與吳叡人

 筆陣：權力魅惑狂獻祭 知識分子作羔羊 ／文：羅永生

【明報文章】為了配合「完善」了的立法會選舉，官方對公民社會的整治行動曾經一度稍息。然而，人們還來不及消化和分析史無前例的「低投票率」到底意味着什麼，新的一波整頓浪潮就撲面而來。多間大學校園內具有重要歷史價值和象徵意義的紀念六四雕塑被火速移除，網上新媒體如「立場新聞」和「眾新聞」也連隨倒下，顯見這場底線未明的「大清算」的焦點，已經由示威者、政治活躍分子、民間組織，去到仍然沒有依附建制的傳媒機構；而被追究的罪名，也由「做過什麼行動」擴大為「寫過什麼文章」、「報道或轉載過什麼信息」、「講過什麼話」。[有一天到看什麼文章，聽什麼廣播，看什麼電影也是罪」

整頓浪潮 撲面而來

今次新一屆立法會的「選舉」結果，唯一有意義的只是「投票率」。對於官方來說，30%看上去是「差強人意」，實際上是「未如理想」。它既說明了大部分選民不認同「選舉制度」是「完善了」於是肯「熱烈地去投票支持」，更間接地表現出在「無大台」的情况下「自發杯葛」仍然奏效。無論官方文宣如何自圓其說、出盡九牛二虎之力去自我解嘲，選舉中「人心尚未回歸」仍然是鐵一般的事實。

於是，經策劃和部署的新一波行動，在選舉後立即一個接一個地執行。先搗毁十多廿年來寄居於大學校園、令六四記憶不斷在香港催化「不服從」思想的圖騰，繼而抓捕獨立自由媒體的負責人，凍結其財產，迫使其停運。只有如此一鼓作氣，才能轉移選舉「失利」的視線。

偶然與想像 (2020)

1. "I do my best to get by every day.  There were hard times, but I wasn't miserable.  Objectively speaking, I must be very happy."  
2. 文學電影典範。
3. 可惜的是，不懂日語，字幕是英語。期望能看到劇本的中文版本。用中文去欣賞一定感覺不同。
4. 三段故事，每節只有兩三個主要演員，沒有情節，場景簡單，純粹用對白來帶動故事的推進。
5. 很奇妙的兩小時，沉浸在這種安靜、純粹。

國安法後香港傳媒：備份資料

1. 港台影片備份： 👉ipfs.io/ipfs/QmfDzyAZHu9EPAoZH7Sm6Ju7Mws58Ja2k1ncapUNDRyhA2  
2. 蘋果備份網站（果靈聞庫）： 👉collection.news
3. 蘋果備份文章（以日期排序，純文字內容） 👉ipfs.io/ipfs/Qmdig4NtBTbUiw9KRri83Warmrp4f5PFFFZMoQUwqXuNbZ
4. 《立場》網站絕大部分文章 
   👉https://web.archive.org/web/20211229143031/https://www.thestandnews.com/
5. 《立場》 Youtube 677 條影片（未齊）可在網上收看：https://bit.ly/3sIGtJE
6. 《立場》Twitter：https://web.archive.org/web/20211229092112/https://twitter.com/StandNewsHK?t=1ihL2Yh8Tip9NsFuETi0Jw&s=09
7. 五夜講場  https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCH0iGbkw1-G_HF_u5uHIxhw/playlists
8. 港台節目https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1JPyevWnxvoq_xzY4ptOgaTaTYSLE9oMva66kxm66K0k/edit#gid=722706461

Simon Shen: The Next 4 Steps in Hong Kong’s March Toward Totalitarianism

• This is a very accurate prediction and analysis. 
• At the beginning of 2022, it's proved Hong Kong is not only fell but it's already ruled by totalitarianism.  

Original text link 

The Next 4 Steps in Hong Kong’s March Toward Totalitarianism

The worst is yet to come for the city. Here are four warning signs to watch for.

By Simon Shen

October 27, 2020

Since the implementation of the National Security Law on July 1, the old Hong Kong that we used to know has disappeared for good. Most recently, the Education Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government controversially revoked a teacher’s license and permanently barred him from teaching. What prompted the disbarment was nothing more than a worksheet that touched on a number of sensitive topics, including Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan.

The “Hong Kong Cultural Revolution” is starting to unfold. Nevertheless, as we keep saying, the worst is yet to come. The forthcoming four milestones on the path toward totalitarianism can be expected.

1. Increase the Economic Costs to Pro-Democrats

Occupations that require a license or professional certification will increasingly use vetting as a political gatekeeper. Those who have not received their licenses will be vetted, and those who have licenses may require regular renewals. This means that people will have to show their loyalty at periodic intervals, in order to ensure that no one says or does anything considered politically incorrect. This could include professions such as law, medicine, accounting, social work and teaching, as well as other professions that provide services to the general public. It could also include civil servants, who are required to take an oath wholeheartedly. Moreover, all these occupations are fundamentally filled by highly educated individuals, many belonging to the“yellow” (pro-democracy) camp.

Those occupations that do not require a license at the moment, particularly in the private sector, will progressively be subject to regulation and licensing requirements created out of thin air. For instance, private tutors may need to take a standardized examination in order to be qualified to teach; otherwise, it may be considered an act of “illicit teaching.” Online publications may require an “online media license” or risk being accused of “unlawful incitement.” Selling cultural and creative products may also require an “artist’s license.” All of these may be just the tip of the iceberg. In short, the general direction is to prevent those who are politically incorrect from having any ability to support themselves financially.

As for business people, the easiest way to ensure compliance is through the use of the Inland Revenue Department. In mainland China, political dissidents with a certain level of publicity are often targeted in this manner. For instance, Ai Weiwei, a Chinese contemporary artist and activist, has been accused of “tax evasion.” In Hong Kong, since small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the keys to sustaining the “yellow economy,” they will probably be the ones that bear the brunt.

2. Weaponize the Courts

After the National Security Law came into effect in Hong Kong, the general direction has been to activate the most draconian laws passed during the colonial era. This implies that anyone can be easily accused, criminalized and imputed. This trend has now begun, but it has not yet become a predominant trend, since it takes time to rectify the judicial branch. By the time the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government are able to cooperate fully, however, such cases will become more common and may be resolved in more conventional ways (for instance, the notorious “interview” phase commonly used by national security forces in mainland China).

In addition to public power, private litigation is also a common way to suppress dissent. Defamation suits, more commonly used in authoritarian societies like Singapore, are one example. Since private litigation is extremely expensive, if the opponent is a government or mega-corporation with almost unlimited resources, pursuing such a lawsuit could bankrupt the target. In the past, people in Hong Kong trusted the rule of law, and there was an underlying understanding that the authorities would not use their power to the fullest extent. However, once this understanding is no longer honored, tyranny could rise through private legal measures, and the result could be drastically different.

3. Make Democrats Social Outcasts

The pressure for Hong Kongers to monitor or spy on each other will soon be seen in the private sphere. Private clubs will soon be asked to add rules that align with government preferences, expelling those who with politically incorrect views from the clubs. The memberships of pan-democrat legislators in the Jockey Club and the memberships of “yellow camp” businessmen in golf clubs could possibly be targeted. Even the memberships of grass-roots welfare agencies and the like may be censored by political vetting to treat those who are politically incorrect as an “outclass.”

Even though civil society in Hong Kong has always flourished, for access to resources most groups rely heavily on government agencies and publicly funded organizations, such as the Hong Kong Jockey Club. In the months and years to come, the approval of funding applications will inevitably undergo political vetting as well. Arts and cultural actors, as well as the innovation and technology sector, will be the hardest hit. While facing applications that are politically correct, approval will be looser. This hidden rule will become a new norm once the message is widely spread.

Hence association will also encounter a variety of difficulties in the near future. Entities established based on the Societies Ordinance will soon face more political scrutiny. Established associations can also have their licenses revoked, with the aim of preventing guilds, labor unions, chambers of commerce and other professional bodies from becoming places where anti-government forces gather. This will lead to a dilemma, in which registered associations organizing large-scale events may be seen as violating the National Security Law, while non-registered organizations organizing events could be accused of encouraging “illegal assembly” or “subversive activities.”

To ensure better self-censorship, whistleblowing and reporting will be institutionalized, and will gradually undermine the mutual trust between the people of Hong Kong, so that it will be harder to establish any forms of organization or resistance. With the advent of digital governance, the threshold for such behaviors has been set at a new low. As a result, those who suffer from the crackdown may risk being betrayed after seeking assistance and eventually face secondary victimization. Taken to its extreme, refusal to report “subversive crimes” under the National Security Law could also be made a crime, as shown by rules in effect during Taiwan’s period of martial law prior to 1987.

4. Restrict Travel Abroad

Last but not least, in an effort to prevent the public from seeking safe havens overseas, there will be more micro-crimes and administration measures implemented, such as withholding citizens’ passports based on trivial pretexts. Hong Kong as a free port will no longer be free. Eventually, if the trend escalates, disobedient people could be required to apply for permission to leave Hong Kong, as seen like in places like Xinjiang, where it has become normal for people not to be in possession of their own passports. In order to destroy any hope of breaking through the wall, non-local income and business could easily fall under the National Security Law as well.

Throughout this transitional period, observers will have the aching and helpless feeling of watching a piece of art being abused and destroyed. We hope, of course, that all these prophecies will prove false. Unfortunately, developments in Hong Kong seem to be pointing in the opposite direction.

Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a visiting scholar of the National Sun Yat-sen University of Taiwan. The author acknowledges Emilia Law for her assistance in this piece.